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INTRODUCTION: GERMAN EXCEPTIONALISM IN MATTERS OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY
It is no longer any secret that there is something peculiar about Germany in matters of economic policy: the country seems to be seriously at odds with macroeconomics. 1 In Germany, macroeconomic policy appears to boil down to just two things: austerity and price stability.
Certainly in recent years Germany was at the forefront of the voices pushing for austerity in the midst of a major slump plaguing the eurozone, asserting that austerity boosts confidence and hence growth (Schäuble 2010 (Schäuble , 2011 . Internationally this hypothesis is known as "expansionary fiscal contraction" (Guarjardo et al. 2011; Blyth 2013; Perotti 2014) . Earlier it was also known as "the German view," at least in the country in which it gained popularity among economists and policymakers in the early 1980s (Fels and Froehlich 1987; Hellwig and Neumann 1987) .
According to a widely held view, Germans care more about price stability than anybody else in the world. The "ghost of Weimar" seems to have given rise to a general fear of debt (Schulden, the German word for debt, is related to guilt) and a peculiar German "stability culture." As a related matter, Germans deeply adored their deutschmark and are still harboring similar feelings for its old-time guardian, the Bundesbank. So much so that this public love affair prompted Jacques Delors to proclaim that: "Not all Germans believe in God, but they all believe in the Bundesbank" (quoted in Issing 2008: 23) .
There is something distinctively "anti-Keynesian" about these German peculiarities, the roots of which this paper sets out to explore. The objective is to show how Germany's anti-Keynesianism 1 Here are some examples that illustrate the point at issue. To begin with, Peter Bofinger, one of Germany's very rare Keynesian voices and a member of the German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE) attests: "There is no doubt that the macroeconomic debate and actual macroeconomic policy in Germany differ considerably from other countries" (Bofinger 2016) . The Economist quotes Winfried Kretschmann, a member of the Alliance '90/Greens and Minister President of the State of Baden-Württemberg, as proclaiming that "'the Swabian housewife represents the starting point' in German thinking on the euro and fiscal management" (Economist, February 1, 2014) . Let me add that while Swabian housewives are known for their thriftiness, Keynes had shown that microeconomic virtues can be macroeconomic vices. Finally, two prominent Financial Times columnists have taken issue with Germany's finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble (2013) , who had famously accused his critics of living in a "parallel universe." Wolfgang Munchau (2014) refers to "the wacky economics of Germany's parallel universe," while Martin Wolf (2013) observes that "[inside Mr Schäuble's 'parallel universe'] pursuit of competitiveness is never recognized for the zero-sum game it is if demand is completely ignored."
is related to today's euro crisis, which is part of the European Union's "existential crisis" and relevant well beyond Europe. 2 We find that Germany has thoroughly misunderstood its own economic history and learned the wrong lessons from it. Germany has misconstrued the true sources of its postwar success and developed an economic policy philosophy that is fundamentally ill-suited for Europe as a whole.
What we describe as the "German model" requires others to behave differently from Germany.
The model worked for (West) Germany because and as long as its partners behaved differently.
The trouble with the euro is that the "Maastricht regime" of economic and monetary union (EMU) required all partners to become like Germany. In other words, the euro was built on a "fallacy of composition," an error of logic highlighted in Keynes's invention of macroeconomics. Making matters worse still, when the German model stopped working for Germany, Germany's knee-jerk reaction was to "restore" its competitiveness. Committing this blunder under the euro was what brought Europe to its knees.
Section 2 offers a brief economic history of Germany up to 1948. Section 3 discusses the German school of economics known as ordoliberalism as a factor that hindered any lasting triumph of Keynesianism in Germany. West Germany's postwar economic history and the German model are the subject of section 4, while section 5 highlights the impact of German unification and German ideas on Europe's EMU. Section 6 depicts Germany's role in causing the euro crisis. Section 7 concludes.
GERMAN ECONOMIC HISTORY UP TO 1948 AND BUNDESBANK

MYTHOLOGY
Germany's economic history prior to 1948 was extraordinarily "rich." That is to say, Germany experienced many extremes, in fact a whole variety of economic calamities. Twice, in the aftermath of (lost) world wars, Germany also had foreign masters decisively impacting its own fate. It is quite easy to identify the respective policy mistakes that caused or aggravated the various dismal episodes the country went through. The point is that Germany's economic history of calamities and policy blunders was mixed and "symmetric"-symmetric in the sense that errors and experiences were actually of opposing kinds.
This is important because Germany's "symmetric," in this sense, historic reality starkly conflicts with the popular and official German historical narrative, which is rather asymmetric: one-sided and very selective. According to the official-popular narrative, Germany seems to have suffered only one kind of calamity, and repeatedly so.
The hypothesis presented here is that the peculiarly one-sided historical narrative represents an important force behind Germany's strangely one-sided policy preferences: priority for austerity
and price stability at all times. The official-popular historical narrative provides inspiration and justification (or excuse) for Germany's odd views on macro policy today.
It is also possible to identify at least one important player, if not the mastermind, behind
Germany's strangely asymmetric historical narrative (Bibow 2010) . 3 The Bundesbank skillfully nourished the asymmetric narrative, since it served its own position and reputation as "guardian of the currency" and guarantor of stability in Germany rather well. The Bundesbank enjoys an international reputation as an inflation hawk, a central bank with a strong anti-inflationary bias (Hayo 1998 ). This strong anti-inflationary policy bias is the counterpart to Germany's strongly biased (asymmetric) historical narrative. In fact, the Bundesbank's fame is closely tied up with what I have also dubbed Germany's "monetary mythology" (or: "Bundesbank mythology"; see Bibow [2013d] Galofré-Vilà et al. 2016 ).
The burden of foreign debt and its treatment in these two episodes illustrates well what I mean by Germany having had "symmetric" experiences with this type of calamity. Clearly some policy approaches are more constructive than others; some are downright counterproductive and ultimately even harm those who inflict undue harshness and punishment.
It is in this light-the light of Germany's own mixed but symmetric experience with foreign indebtedness and debt forgiveness-that the modern reader is invited to reflect upon Germany's role in the ongoing eurozone crisis, Germany's barbaric treatment of Greece in particular. How can we understand modern Germany's treatment of Greece? What kind of lessons did Germany learn from its own history (Ritschl 2011 (Ritschl , 2012 ? Does Germany think that its own treatment after WWI was somehow superior to its later one?
The second example is as illustrative and puzzling as the previous example. In the first half of the 20th century, Germany experienced extreme price level instability and currency crises. But, again, Germany experienced symmetry: first hyperinflation in 1922-23, and then deflation during the Great Depression of 1929-33. And, yet, the official-popular narrative features asymmetry. Apparently Germany only suffered one kind of calamity, one type of disorder:
hyperinflation.
Consider the comments of the late Hans Tietmeyer, life-long government official and Bundesbank president from 1993 until 1999. According to Tietmeyer (1991) :
The reasons for the success of German monetary policy in defending price stability are in part historical. The experience gained twice with hyperinflation in the first half of this century has helped to develop a special sensitivity to inflation and has caused the wider public to believe in the critical importance of monetary stability in Germany. For this reason, the strong position of the Bundesbank is widely accepted by the general public-questioning its independence even seems to be a national taboo. This social consensus has yielded strong support for the policy of the Bundesbank.
Note that Tietmeyer refers to Germany's monetary history but does not mention deflation.
Instead, Germany (allegedly) suffered not just one, but two hyperinflations. He also describes a tight connection between this historical hyperinflation experience "gained twice" and the special position in Germany gained by the Bundesbank.
Of course Germany did not suffer any second hyperinflation. It was just that when Germany went under as a result of a lost total war, the German currency went under with it. This meant that it was left to the new government of the newly established West Germany to find a political (re-)distributional compromise when organizing a fresh start. 5 To concoct a narrative around any specific loss and special worthiness of "the German saver" 6 in the context of the all-pervasive human grief and destruction of WWII is economic nonsense and sickening political hypocrisy.
To see a public figure like Tietmeyer utter this kind of nonsense is a national disgrace that should 5 Actually, and conveniently, the Allies settled this issue for West Germany (to-be), which handed the new federal government (to-be) a clean and free hand in addressing postwar (internal) reconciliation. It also meant that "while Western Europe in the 1950s struggled with debt/GDP ratios close to 200 percent, the new West German state enjoyed debt/GDP ratios of less than 20 percent" (Ritschl 2012) . 6 Today, as the most recent mutation and disgraceful outgrowth of Bundesbank mythology, that very honorable character, the German saver, is under frontal attack by no other than the Bundesbank's successor, the European Central Bank, which is allegedly expropriating the German saver and bankrupting German banks by means of its negative interest policy. Because of Germany's hyperinflation experience, "gained twice," the German saver always needs special care and protection, which only the Bundesbank can properly provide, it seems-and no matter how utterly dismal the economic situation in the rest of the eurozone may be.
be treated as a criminal offence. Of course it is not, as this kind of "currency denial" seems to suit certain interests rather well. [T]wo different approaches to economic policymaking on each side of the Atlantic. While US policymakers like to focus on short-term corrective measures, we take the longer view and are, therefore, more preoccupied with the implications of excessive deficits and the dangers of high inflation. So are German consumers. This aversion to deficits and inflationary fears, which have their roots in German history in the past century, may appear peculiar to our American friends, whose economic culture is, in part, shaped by deflationary episodes. Yet these fears are among the most potent factors of consumption and saving rates in our country. Seeking to engineer more domestic demand by raising government borrowing even further would, here at least, be counterproductive. On the contrary, restoring confidence in our ability to cut the deficit is a prerequisite for balanced and sustainable growth.
Note that Schäuble, too, refers to German history, which was special and remains of special importance to economic policymaking in Germany today. Germans are said to have a special aversion to deficits and inflation. American economic culture, by contrast, was also shaped by "deflationary episodes."
To repeat, Germany experienced both: hyperinflation and deflation. In fact, the economic hardship caused by the Great Depression was quite as bad in Germany as in the US; Hitler's Nazi movement saw little gains in popularity until unemployment soared after 1929 (Johnson 1998 We know very well that debt gets a country into trouble and therefore must be avoided above all else, as well (even if we may be a little forgetful at times about the forgiveness granted to us in this regard). In addition, we also know that price stability never does any harm to growth but actually causes growth-as that has been our own post-WWII experience (on which more in a moment).
I may add here that Germany's economic journalism is quite exceptionally poor and Germany's economics profession mediocre. Of course, the socialization of German journalists and economists also happens within the national climate of monetary mythology described above (Hayo and Neumeier 2016) . With such effective indoctrination, there is little room for thinkers and nonbelievers.
As I already suggested above, the Bundesbank, that central bank that is better than God, has been a key proponent (if not the mastermind) behind this peculiar German mythology. A related and rather interesting fact is that the German Reichsbank was actually an "independent central bank" during both extreme episodes: the Weimar hyperinflation of 1922-23, and deflation of the early 1930s (Holtfrerich 1988) . So one could rightly argue that Germany's experience with central bank independence was actually very poor, with symmetry describing the kind of failures produced; as did, for instance, Herbert Giersch, the godfather of "supply-side economics" in West Germany (see Giersch and Lehment 1981) .
So here is another puzzle (or two) then. How did Germans come to see central bank independence as such an inherent part of their perceived economic success and peculiar stability culture? And how did (West) Germany end up with an independent central bank in the first place?
The issue of central bank independence has been woven into Bundesbank mythology in an intriguing way. We will only be able to answer the first question fully once we have appreciated the substance of the "German model." About the second question there exists some confusion and controversy.
I will be brief here. 7 For details, see Bibow (2009 Bibow ( , 2010 and the literature quoted there.
Initially, there was considerable opposition to granting the central bank independence, including from German industry, from within the economics profession, and particularly from within the government itself. Having enjoyed a head start, however, central bankers played their cards well.
Fights inside the government went in their favor, too. The central bankers were not shy about provoking public conflicts with the government if this could be exploited to foster their own reputation (as "guardian of stability"; see Goodman [1992] ; Henning [1994] ; Johnson [1998] ; Kaltenthaler [1998] ; Marsh [1992] ). Until the arrival of the euro, the Bundesbank had another 40 years to foster its "untouchable" status (and nourish Germany's peculiar monetary mythology along the way). 
ORDOLIBERALISM VS. KEYNESIANISM IN WEST GERMANY
It is not true that Keynes and Keynesianism have never reached Germany. Keynes was a wellknown and highly respected economist in Germany ever since the publication of "The Economic
Consequences of the Peace" (Keynes 1919 in the discussion of the earlier Treatise had either fled the country, gleichgeschaltet (i.e., collaborated with the Nazi regime), or operated in a kind of internal exile (Hagemann 2016 ).
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As it happened, "ordoliberalism" emerged as a product of internal exile under the Nazi regime.
Walter Eucken (1892 Eucken ( -1950 , the leader of the "Freiburg School" of ordoliberalism, risked his life by opposing the Nazis. 9 During the war, this peculiar German branch of the neoliberal movement of the 1930s developed plans for the postwar Wirtschaftsordnung (economic order;
"ordo" in Greek) to be established in Germany. In a way, it is not very surprising that the ordoliberals developed a strong dislike of any form of "interventionism," "experimentation,"
"command economy" (Planwirtschaft), or central planning, which they associated either with the horrors of the Nazi regime and/or the instability of the Weimar Republic. It was their Nazi regime experience and the earlier chaos of the Weimar Republic that framed their perception of Keynes's General Theory as excessively and dangerously interventionistic (James 1989 )-providing ordoliberalism with a distinctive anti-Keynesian flavor from the start.
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Put in a nutshell, ordoliberlism envisions a strong state as the force that establishes and guards the market order, but refrains from interfering in market processes. Interfering in market processes constitutes interventionism, which is rejected. But ordoliberals also reject laissez-faire (classical) liberalism, which they associate with the concentration and abuse of private power in the presence of a weak state. The historical background here is the late industrialization of Germany in the 19th century, and the militarism that ensued, which nourished wars and the suppression of personal liberties (Hutchison 1979; Rieter and Schmolz 1993) .
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So the strong state has a key role to play in establishing the market order, safeguarding competition, offsetting externalities, and even organizing some income redistribution. But it is essential to maintain a well-functioning price mechanism and not interfere with it-provided a proper order was set up that prevents the concentration and abuse of private power.
According to Eucken (1940 Eucken ( , 1952 , a well-functioning price mechanism presupposes currency stability. He therefore declared the "primacy of currency policy" (Primat der Währungspolitik)
as a vital complement to establishing a competitive market order. In general, ordoliberals and the Bundesbank make a lot of buzz about this "primacy." In my view, Eucken's concern for price stability is little different from Keynes's (1923) While (West) Germany's peculiar variety of neoliberalism was a homegrown product of Germany's peculiar history, Keynesianism was imported to (West) Germany in its "bastard" or "synthesis" form from early on, too (Hagemann 2000) . Keynesians were well represented on scientific advisory councils from the beginning. Keynesians captured many university positions in economics throughout West Germany until the 1970s. Keynesians were present in public debates and the media, too. By contemporary international comparison, Germany was not special for missing out on the "Keynesian revolution," but for the fact that Keynesianism faced a strong homegrown competitor in ordoliberalism.
And ordoliberalism had luck on its side when West Germany's first federal government included a popular free-market champion in Ludwig Erhard ). Erhard's popular fame rests on his supposed role in West Germany's Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle). He is seen as the architect of the miracle and the establishment of West Germany's "social market economy" (soziale Marktwirtschaft), supposedly a market economy that is not of a "laissez-faire" type, but one that embraces social responsibility together with personal liberties. Ordoliberalism's luck was its initial association with Ludwig Erhard and the economic miracle.
Thanks to these early success, ordoliberalism's initial impact left a lasting impressionconscientiously kept alive by West Germany's right-wing parties and vested interests to this day.
As initial luck and perceived success secured a lasting influence of ordoliberalism, Keynesianism has been assigned a difficult stand in Germany until today (a kind of "path dependency").
In all this, one big puzzle truly stands out: How did the Bundesbank emerge as the untouchable saint and ultimate source of economic wisdom given that Walter Eucken strongly opposed central bank independence? We will address this puzzle in a moment.
Before we begin, we briefly turn to Keynesianism's fleeting moment in the sun in West
Germany. The heydays of Keynesianism in West Germany were in the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s (Dillard 1985; Allen 1989; Hagemann 2000 (Marsh 1992) . A "grand coalition" of conservatives and social democrats took over the government until 1969, when the social democrats became the strongest party and were able to form a new coalition government with the liberals ("free democrats") as junior partners, when in the past they had formed coalition governments with the conservatives.
The rise of the social democrats in the 1960s was owed mostly to the charisma of Willy Brandt 
GERMAN POST-WW II ECONOMIC HISTORY AND THE "GERMAN
MODEL"
The Real incomes and consumption grew steadily, too. Prosperity was widely shared as unemployment steadily declined, providing jobs for millions of refugees who had reached West
Germany at the end of the war from Eastern Europe and continued to trickle in until the "Berlin
Wall" was built in 1961-at which point West Germany started attracting immigrant ("guest")
workers from southern Europe to meet emerging labor shortages (Giersch, Paque, and Schmieding 1992) .
There are certain similarities between West Germany's miracle phase and what happened during the postwar reconstruction boom elsewhere in Western Europe. West Germany stands out for one thing in particular, which is at the heart of the "German model": West Germany's inflation was very low, lower than the inflation performance of its main trading partners. The Bundesbank built its reputation on this achievement of stability. But much more was involved.
In the context of the international Bretton Woods monetary order of pegged nominal exchange rates, West Germany would make cumulative improvements in its competitiveness by keeping its inflation rate not just low, but below inflation trends experienced elsewhere. While trade was growing strongly worldwide at the time, German exports received an extra lift in this way, for the West German authorities always resisted deutschmark revaluation pressures for as long as possible, even in the face of persistent and sizeable trade and current account surpluses.
There is some evidence that the West German authorities actually understood what they were doing, that the "German model" was conceived as a deliberate development strategy. The balance of payments crisis of 1950-51 provided the opportunity and the starting shot. External pressure to boost exports was helpful. The men at the helm of the BdL and the architect of the economic miracle, Ludwig Erhard, were in accord. In August 1950, Erhard detected that a "great opportunity for the future of German exports has arisen out of the current situation. If, namely, through internal discipline we are able to maintain the price level to a greater extent than other countries, our export strength will increase in the long run and our currency will become stronger and health [ier] , both internally and with respect to the dollar" (quoted in Holtfrerich 2008: 35; emphasis added).
From the beginning, West Germany became (over-)reliant on exports for its growth, successfully pursuing a model of export-led growth, featuring persistent external surpluses (Wallich 1955; Hölscher 1994; Holtfrerich 1998 ). The government would balance its budget, or at times even run fiscal surpluses, and generally abstain from active fiscal stabilization policies. The requirement was to achieve superior "internal discipline," as Erhard had pointed out. Towards this end, Erhard himself often actively preached "moderation."
But it fell to the Bundesbank to adopt the role as chief enforcer of internal discipline-of balanced budgets and wage moderation, in particular. Success as the discipline enforcer enabled the Bundesbank to build its reputation and fame on an inflation record that was superior (for the lower inflation, the better) to its competitors without standing in the way of growth or playing much of an active part in stimulating domestic demand. In fact, owing to the working of the German model, in West Germany price stability appeared to cause growth.
As price stability paid off for both the Bundesbank and the country as a whole, it became even more important to nourish the country's monetary mythology. Interested parties were quite happy to include the Bundesbank, central bank independence, and price stability into the ordoliberal success story that had given West Germany its economic miracle. The deutschmark and its stability became part of German pride, and its guardian, the independent Bundesbank, as Following two decades of strict internal discipline, albeit with steady and sizeable gains in productivity and real wages, wage inflation started to accelerate in West Germany in the late 1960s. Schiller turned more and more active in managing "concerted action," the process of reconciliation and compromise between social partners designed to keep wage-price inflation in check-and lower than elsewhere. Meanwhile, the federal government, led by social democrats, added more social democratic attributes to West Germany's "social market economy," including expanding the welfare state and strengthening workers' rights. The balance of power in labor relations was shifting in labor's favor. Yet these developments as such did not undermine the German model, as inflation in West Germany stayed lower than elsewhere.
Then the other shoe dropped in the early 1970s with the demise of the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates. The deutschmark appreciated strongly until the late 1970s. This helped to contain inflationary pressures, but worked against the German model. Then the OPEC oil price hike hit the global economy and provided yet another blow to the West German economy: a triple whammy of rising wage inflation, currency appreciation, and terms-of-trade deterioration.
Unemployment soared to over one million and, as elsewhere in the western world, West
Germany was suffering from "stagflation." By international comparison, however, it was a fairly mild dose. Budget deficits and public debt rose in line with unemployment and interest rate levels. In response to OPEC I, fiscal expansion was tried to some degree and with some measure of success while the Bundesbank was exploring the newly popular monetarist wisdom of monetary targeting (Giersch, Paque, and Schmieding 1992; Richter 1999 ).
Mirroring US weakness, the deutschmark was beginning to receive more and more financial investor attention as an alternative reserve currency competing with the US dollardevelopments which the Bundesbank was always keen to contain, as they threaten the German model. Given West Germany's relative economic strength, the US authorities put pressure on the Schmidt government in 1978 to share the burden of acting as a "locomotive" by adding fiscal stimulus measures and limiting monetary tightening. Germany complied to some extent but the boost turned out to be ill-timed, as inflation reaccelerated with the second OPEC oil-price shock.
Simultaneously, the current account turned into deficit in 1979 and the deutschmark weakened.
Panic seemed to grip the authorities. The Bundesbank tightened its monetary stance sharply.
Procyclical fiscal tightening was enacted in the early 1980s, even prior to the fall of the Schmidt government in 1982. The new right-wing government, led by Helmut Kohl, was to embrace supply-side economics and henceforth deny any role for demand management. This concluded West Germany's brief flirtation with Keynesianism that had started in 1967.
The GCEE had prepared the ground for the Wende (U-turn) in economic policy during the 1970s (Sachverständigenrat 1977; Sievert 1980 Sievert , 2003 Spahn 2010 ). This was not based on any scientific breakthrough, of course. Quite the opposite. The GCEE simply declared that "Say's law" was valid after all. The German version of Say's law says that you can always produce more for sale abroad unless you are lacking competitiveness. So a lack of competitiveness may hinder growth and employment. By contrast, domestic demand and hence demand management can never be an issue. That at least is the German perspective (see Helmstädter 1988) . Hence, German policy wisdom is simple and straightforward: monetary policy has to focus on price stability and fiscal policy on balancing the budget. Beyond that there is no more to be doneprovided that competitiveness is sufficient for exports to drive the economy. The wise men repeat their message every year in all too many words that cannot hide this simple substance.
The German model of export-led growth had indeed been under threat during the 1970s, hit by that triple whammy of currency appreciation, rising wages, and terms-of-trade deterioration.
While exports became a less-reliable growth engine, domestic demand temporarily rose in prominence. Private consumption especially became more of a source of growth as income distribution shifted in favor of labor. Fiscal policy was more active, too, as unemployment stayed high for unusually long.
These developments frustrated certain powerful interests, which found an expression, for Even before the demise of the Bretton Woods system, Western Europe had started exploring ways to stabilize exchange rates regionally. Early attempts had failed, but at the end of the decade West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt led the initiative that established the EMS, which included the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the European Currency Unit (ECU).
The former was the mechanism through which national currencies were meant to be stabilized, with the latter serving as (a politically neutral) anchor. While there were still numerous "realignments" in the early years, exchange rates "hardened" following a critical French macro policy U-turn in 1983. Essentially, countries participating in the ERM accepted Bundesbank leadership, as pegging to the deutschmark was judged a convenient way to disinflate and achieve inflation convergence towards the low benchmark set by West Germany. Once again, West
Germany would achieve cumulative competitiveness gains under a system of pegged exchange rates owing to the fact that its inflation rate was lower than that of its partners.
In other words, in 1983, the German model was back in business. West Germany ran up rising external surpluses over the course of the 1980s. While bilateral surpluses vis-à-vis the US shrunk, together with the US dollar's decline after 1985, they were replaced by soaring intraregional imbalances vis-à-vis West Germany's European partners that used the deutschmark anchor to disinflate their economies. In addition, owing to income tax cuts, private consumption and investment picked up towards the end of the decade: West Germany achieved 4 percent GDP growth in both 1988 and 1989. This put paid to the official dogma that "structural problems"
were holding back the economy. Strong growth balanced the West German government's budget. Public finances were generally in poorer shape in other ERM member countries. Similar regional developments were later to reemerge under the euro. Be that as it may, on the eve of German unification, the West German economy presented itself in great shape and ready to cope with the coming surprise challenge of unification (Bibow 2005) .
GERMAN UNIFICATION AND EMU: "MADE IN GERMANY"
By historical accident rather than design, German unification unleashed a sizeable Keynesian fiscal stimulus. For the rest of Europe, the stimulus was well-timed and highly welcome. If the neoliberal dogma of all-pervasive structural problems is believed, it was ill-timed for uniting Germany itself. For on this view, the West German economy was nearly fully employed when the "unification shock" hit. Remarkably, the West German economy grew at a 5 percent rate in both 1990 and 1991, with only a fairly mild rise in inflation but a huge rise in employment.
Official statistics today suggest that consumer price inflation peaked at 5 percent in the early 1990s. That would be very close to hyperinflation by German standards. Two factors are overlooked here, though. First, there was a one-off price-level adjustment taking place in the former East Germany, where prices had been held constant for the previous 40 years. Second, government measures rather than market forces were responsible for a significant upward price shock, as indirect taxes and administered prices were raised to contain the budget deficit of 3 percent of GDP. Excluding "tax-push inflation," consumer price inflation in former West Germany barely reached 3 percent.
In most countries central bankers would be grilled on whether, in the face of the historical challenge of unification, it was wise to deliberately cause the recession of 1992-93. In Germany, independent central bankers are not supposed to be doubted, no matter how costly their blunders may be. In 1991, the Bundesbank had not only hiked interest rates to 10 percent, but simultaneously the central bank also applied massive pressure on the government for a swift fiscal U-turn toward austerity. The Bundesbank then ignored that austerity (through tax-push inflation) distorted inflation upwards.
And the Bundesbank also added another blunder on top: it allowed itself to be misled by its monetary target, M3, a broad monetary aggregate that includes interest-yielding time and saving deposits. When the Bundesbank pushed its short-term policy rate into overkill territory, banks started piling into long-term bonds and the yield curve inverted. This made bank deposits paying 10 percent interest even more attractive to the public. The Bundesbank failed to understand why its monetary target had been overshot. After first tightening money to a degree that broke the economy's neck, Germany's independent central bank then proved extraordinarily slow to ease despite the recession, misreading the working of its own medicine. As Walter Eucken had emphasized, there is a downside to discretion: incompetent independent central bankers can pose a big risk to economic well-being.
If the Bundesbank's tight money stance was excessively tight for Germany, it was utterly out of tune with the situation elsewhere in Europe. So, the Bundesbank's tight money crusade also blew up the ERM (Hefeker 1994) . The ERM crises of 1992-93, together with temporarily elevated German inflation, amounted to a significant real deutschmark revaluation against the rest of Europe. Together with the unification boom, this had the welcome side effect of rebalancing Europe. West Germany's current account surplus of 5 percent of GDP prior to unification had turned into a small all-German deficit.
Europe got rebalanced by these events, but the recession of the early 1990s did not help the cause of the economic and monetary union (EMU) that foresaw the introduction of a common currency by 1997 (or later). The EMU policy regime, agreed upon at Maastricht in 1991, largely followed the German rulebook (Dyson and Featherstone 1999; James 2012) . Germany was in a strong negotiating position to make the Bundesbank's abdication of monetary rule over Europe conditional on its partners' signing up to a "stability union" (based on prescriptions informed by Germany's monetary mythology). Countries keen to join the German-style "stability union"
jointly engaged in unconditional austerity and continued to disinflate toward the German stability benchmark. After having been banned from Germany for a decade, Keynes also got banned from Europe's EMU-which would henceforth (attempt to) operate according to its German rulebook. Little wonder Germany's export engine would not catch fire quite so easily anymore. The 1990s became a decade similarly disappointing as the first half of the 1980s, characterized by protracted stagnation and slow recovery. In due course Germany would become known as the "sick man of Europe" (and a little later as the "sick man of the euro"; see Dustmann et al. [2014] ). In Germany, poor performance was largely blamed on the "burden" of unification and, as usual, on "structural problems." In reality, it was not unification as such but the macro policy response to unification that had derailed the West German economy. The deliberately provoked recession of the early 1990s, which was the Bundesbank's crusade to prevent a third hyperinflation within one century, cost West Germany roughly 1.5 million jobs. These pointless job losses greatly augmented the budgetary pressures more directly related to the unification challenge.
Part of the unification challenge was owed to the fact that former East Germany's infrastructure, environment, and economic structures in general were rundown and/or outdated. It was clear from the beginning that an enormous volume of investment was needed to fix this deficiency.
Another part of the unification challenge arose from fast and premature wage convergence between east and west. Given the poor state of the economy, productivity levels in former East
Germany were way below West German levels. When East German wages shot up literally overnight, whole industries and millions of jobs in the east turned uncompetitive just as fast.
Unbalanced competitiveness positions inflated the intra-German "transfer union" that was initiated with the unification of the two very unequal Germanys. With a unified fiscal and social regime, there would be automatic fiscal redistribution from the richer and/or growing regions (the west) to the poorer and/or stagnant ones (the east).
When Germany (re-)united in 1990, a monetary union between the two former Germanys was established that was also at once a fiscal union. Former East Germany was simply incorporated into the West German social systems, federal budget, and other budgetary processes. When millions of jobs were lost overnight in the east, which was left uncompetitive due to wage convergence, this created an enormous drain on the newly united fiscal and social union. The
German transfer union led to the introduction of a special "solidarity tax" (an income tax surcharge) in the former West Germany. This experience alerted Germany to the risks of a transfer union. So Germany put even more pressure on its prospective EMU partners to, as it were, "get their fiscal house in order." In Germany itself, fiscal policy was by now reduced to little else but a blind obsession with balancing the budget no matter what.
Needless to say, the joint austerity crusade undertaken across the continent in the name of Maastricht did not help either. Europe got a foretaste of things that later reached their full blossom under the euro. But in Germany, stagnation and high unemployment can never be domestic-demand related; they can only be a reflection of a lack of competitiveness. Hence
Germany's knee-jerk and fateful response was to set out to "restore" its competitiveness, which was embraced as national agenda around 1996.
THE EURO CRISIS, TOO, WAS "MADE IN GERMANY"
It is not necessary to delve in any length or detail here into the developments that led to the euro crisis about a decade after the common currency was launched. I have done so elsewhere (Bibow 2006 (Bibow , 2007 (Bibow , 2012 and will only briefly summarize the broad picture here.
The ERM of pre-euro times allowed for exchange rate "realignments." By contrast, members of a currency union lose the ability to adjust intraunion competitiveness positions through exchange rate adjustments. It therefore becomes absolutely essential to prevent diverging competitiveness positions from arising in the first place. The ECB's definition of price stability as "below, but close to 2 percent" provides the common benchmark that national unit-labor cost trends have to align themselves with. If national unit-labor cost trends persistently diverge from the common norm, member states will be drifting apart and the currency union will be set on a collision course (Flassbeck 1997) .
It is a great irony that once Germany had convinced its euro partners to sign up to the rules of the German-style stability union, it was Germany itself that reneged on the most essential euro commitment. Around 1996, it became Germany's national agenda to "restore" its competitiveness. Alas, it was a grand illusion that Germany had anything to restore. True, former
East Germany was undergoing a comprehensive revamp. Former West Germany, by contrast, had simply lost the undue and unsustainable competitiveness advantage it had previously accumulated over the course of the 1980s as the rest of Europe was practicing disinflation while pegging to the deutschmark.
It may have felt differently to Germany and its powerful export interests. A country that runs persistent trade surpluses-the German model at work-will see its economic structures adapt to its distorted aggregate demand composition as certain export industries will expand at the expense of other, more domestic-oriented ones. German unification and the ERM crises had rebalanced Europe, and Europe had converged to Germany's historical stability standard and the agreed-upon common EMU norm of 2 percent inflation. The right conclusion would have been that the German model had outlived its practicability under the euro. Exporting the model to Europe through the euro meant just that. Unfortunately, though, the German authorities fallaciously thought differently. it would lead to notorious outcries in West Germany, where this was widely seen as "unfair."
Sievert's "promise" suggests that Germany had lured its euro partners into a euro trap: inside the trap German competitiveness gains achieved through wage moderation would no longer be "watered down" through currency appreciation.
I describe this as an error in economic logic because Sievert's implicit policy prescription-wage moderation to "restore" competitiveness-clearly clashes with another German policy objective, namely that Europe's EMU must not be a "transfer union." Germany had just experienced that unbalanced competitiveness positions inside a currency union lead to large fiscal transfers. After grossly mishandling the German unification challenge, Germany was adamant that the EMU must not lead to the creation of another transfer union (at Germany's expense) at the European level.
The vital point that Sievert's policy prescription misses is that running up persistent trade surpluses inside a currency union ultimately makes a transfer union inevitable. I dubbed this "Germany's euro trilemma," namely that Germany "cannot have it all-perpetual export The ECB's common monetary policy stance was consistently too tight for sick (stagnant)
Germany, but consistently too easy for the later euro-crisis countries. These countries had received an early boost from the interest rate convergence process of the late 1990s. Germany's protracted stagnation under the euro added a second leg to existing trends: bubbles emerged in the periphery and intra-area imbalances built up. While Germany implemented numerous rounds of fiscal austerity only to overshoot the 3 percent Maastricht budget ceiling again, bubble economies like Spain and Ireland had scope for tax cuts.
All along, Germany's competitiveness improved, while it deteriorated in the later euro-crisis countries. Germany started running rising trade surpluses, while its euro partners had rising trade deficits; hence Germany's net external asset position improved, while the euro periphery's net external indebtedness deteriorated towards 100 percent of GDP. To the vigilant observer these developments were an accident waiting to happen (Bibow 2006 ). Yet the euro authorities were sleeping at the wheel while most mainstream economists agreed that inside a currency union the member countries' external positions would somehow be irrelevant.
The global financial crisis that originated in the US subprime mortgage market segment provided the initial external trigger. The euro area immediately had a banking crisis at hand.
Simultaneously, its homegrown bubbles and imbalances imploded, too.
Remarkably, in 2009, Germany went through a brief "Keynes moment." I described the fiscal expansion at the time of German unification as a historical accident. This time it was a spontaneous Keynesian policy move to counter the global crisis and stimulate domestic demand.
The fact that Germany had a federal election in the fall of 2009 probably helped. Global cooperation through the G20 probably also helped to contain Germany's natural instincts to simply freeload on exports (i.e., on other countries' stimulus measures). In the event, Germany's fiscal stimulus of 2009-10 was both sizeable and effective, and in 2010 Germany experienced a brisk recovery from the crisis.
But then the Greek debacle provided Germany with a welcome excuse to impose a quick return to unconditional austerity in Europe's EMU, allegedly as the unavoidable medicine to counter the so-called "sovereign debt crisis."
Europe's monetary union had failed to prevent the internal divergences and imbalances that were bound to cause fragility and end in crisis. When (inevitably) crisis finally arrived, Europe's monetary union-the supposed stability union-was ill-equipped to deal with it. Importantly, both the design of said monetary union and the very causes of its internal divergences and imbalances were actually "made in Germany." To add insult to injury, as the union's number one creditor nation, Germany then also came to dictate the improvised crisis response, which largely consisted of mindless austerity. Germany's price stability obsession also hindered a more timely and courageous response from the ECB (Bibow 2016 ).
Germany's constant attacks on the ECB in recent years are particularly ironic and only show that the German authorities still do not appreciate Germany's euro trilemma: the ECB's "unconventional" monetary policies are the last thing standing between Germany and a de facto eurozone transfer union. In case of a euro breakup, Germany will be presented with ex post transfers in the form of massive wealth losses on its foreign claims (Bibow 2013a ).
On a slightly more positive note, since the crisis, Germany's unit-labor cost trend has increased and is now consistent with the ECB's 2 percent inflation benchmark. But, as figure 1 shows, Germany has resisted "internal revaluation," which would require (upward) convergence of Germany's price level with the price-level path that is implied by the ECB's 2 percent inflation benchmark.
This has effectively forced everyone else into "internal devaluation" and (downward) convergence with Germany's own lower price-level path. In some cases, this involved outright deflation. In all cases, massive economic hardship has left social and political instabilities in its wake. Germany's deep-seated macro policy folly-the country's notorious anti-Keynesianismhas brought Europe to its knees. Almost a decade into the euro crisis, Europe's common currency remains a ticking time bomb. The ideas that brought wreckage to Europe have historical roots though: the success of the German model that was the basis of West Germany's postwar "economic miracle," its rise to prosperity and respectability, and eventual (re-)unification in 1990. Unfortunately, Germany has never fully understood the true sources of its success and learned the wrong lessons from its own economic history.
A peculiar monetary mythology has been at play here that justified the Bundesbank's stout antiinflationary bias. This approach brought fame to the Bundesbank itself and German pride in the soundness of its deutschmark. Importantly, for a long time the Bundesbank's distinctive brand, its bias against (hyper-)inflation, and Germany's stability culture did not hinder but even supported German growth: export-led growth. For in the context of pegged nominal exchange rates, achieving a superior (lower) inflation record translates into competitiveness gains. In this way, (West) Germany learned to live quite well without Keynesian demand management. The
Bundesbank's real role was to enforce discipline-superior ("German") discipline in the form of wage moderation and balanced budgets. Effectively, Germany took Keynes's diagnosis of mercantilism in chapter 23 of the General Theory to heart, but ignored the remaining 23 chapters, thereby getting away with it by relying on others to do the real job.
The German model was launched, innocently enough, with the balance-of-payments crisis of 1950-51, when boosting exports was an urgency. It became a notorious habit-a habit that is intricately interwoven with Bundesbank mythology and which Germany cannot let go of.
Somehow it all also seemed to confirm the supposed wisdom of ordoliberalism, so that an element of path dependency in policymaking made Germany a difficult place for Keynesian ideas to penetrate, and lastingly so.
Europe's tragedy is that under the thick fog of its monetary mythology, Germany failed to appreciate that the success of the German model critically depends on others behaving differently from itself. Exporting the German model to Europe was begging for trouble, and featured a fallacy of composition: Germany's export engine would stall when everyone becomes just like Germany.
